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Abstract 
The paper will provide a summary of all lifelines performance in this strong earthquake. The paper will discuss the 
damage, emergency response, and recovery of electric power, telecommunication, transportation (roads and bridges), 
seaports, airports, water and wastewater, and their facilities. The impact as a result of the lifelines service interruption 
will be discussed; most important is the discussion of lifelines interdependence. 
Each lifeline will be separated into its own section that presents the failure modes, emergency response, and recovery of 
service. Each section will end with observations and recommendations. 
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1. General Geotechnical Aspects 
On February 27, 2010, at 3:34 A.M. local time, there was a moment magnitude (Mw) 8.8 earthquake off 
the west coast of Maule Region, Chile. This earthquake, which was located offshore at 35.909°S, 72.733°W 
with a depth of 35 km and had a plate rupture area of about 550 km by 150 km, shook a large region with an 
estimated 80% of Chile’s population, Figure 1. The earthquake occurred in a region of known high 
seismicity at the interface between the Nazca plate and the South American tectonic plates. The epicenter is 
located 335 km SW of Santiago the capital of Chile and 105 km NNE of the coastal city of Concepción. 
Numerous large aftershocks occurred over the months, including more than 130 magnitude 6 or higher 
aftershocks within the following week. 
In addition to the main shock, which caused coastal regions to both uplift and subside, tsunami waves hit 
the low lying Chilean coastline as well as distant shores across the Pacific Ocean. The tsunami, which 
fortunately occurred during a low tide, had various characteristics up and down the coast. Along the south 
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coast of Chile, there were three main surges, which resulted in a maximum run-up height of 20 m and a 
maximum inland inundation distance of 12 km from the coastline.  
The earthquake resulted in over 60 seconds of strong shaking and a recorded maximum 0.65 g peak 
ground accelerations (PGA) in the Concepción area. Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) of VIII was 
experienced in a number of coastal and inland communities, Figure 1. The geologic conditions of this area 
vary from mountainous terrain and valleys to river and coastal terrains. The ground water conditions were 
favorably low because the earthquake occurred towards the end of summer. As a result, there were fewer 
occurrences of landslides and ground related failures due to liquefaction, lateral spreading, and bearing 
capacity. Some areas in Concepción were subjected to focusing of high seismic energy as well as ground 
motion amplification due to soft soils.  
Figure 1 MMI contours and the area of the rupture zone (150 x 550 km). (Source: USGS) 
Ground shaking and ground failures impacted all lifelines and resulted in damage to buildings, bridges, 
highways, railways, and ports, and interruption of transportation, water and wastewater, gas and liquid fuel, 
electric power, and telecommunication services, as well as contributing to lifeline interdependence and 
coupling issues. Areas with engineered soils including industrial facilities on wetland sites, retaining walls 
and ground improvement appeared to perform well. 
2. Electric Power System 
The distribution of source of electric power generation in Chile is 22.7% coal, 24.6% oil, 7.90% gas, 
5.30% biomass, and 39.50% hydro. Many large facilities have their own backup power generation to 
maintain business operation continuity.  
There was minor damage to power generation plants in the impacted area. Hydro power plants had no 
reported damage, as they are all located away from the coast in the lower Andes. 
Transelec and CGE are the two major power service providers that serve the earthquake-impacted area. 
Most of the distribution systems in this area are operated by CGE, while high voltage transmission is by 
Transelec.
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2.1. Transmission system 
The transmission network (200 kV and 500 kV) designed with earthquake provisions of 0.30g PGA 
performed reasonably well and was ready to energize within 24 hours after the main shock. The long 
narrow configuration of the system dictated by the shape of the country and the topography of the land 
limits transmission line route dispersion and system redundancy. While much of the equipment is the same 
as that found in North America, Chile makes extensive use of pantograph disconnect switches and 
candlestick live-tank circuit breakers, which are used sparingly in the earthquake zones of North America. 
More than 25 failures occurred but that these failures represented a small percentage of the inventory. A 
couple of towers crossing Biobío River collapsed. 
Lower voltage sub-transmission systems for the coastal communities that experienced higher levels of 
ground shaking (PGA = 0.2g to 0.45g) suffered sporadic damage.  
2.2. Distribution system 
The low voltage (34.5 kV and below) distribution system sustained minor damage due to collapsed 
buildings and damaged poles.  The hardest hit regions were Region VII (Maule) and Region VIII (Biobío).  
One power company had to replace 450 poles and lost 1,500 poles out of an installed base of 759,000, and 
82 transformers out of 50,109. Most of these losses were in the tsunami areas. Most of the distribution 
system damage was a result of building collapse where drop wires were severed or buildings damage the 
poles. 
Two weeks after the earthquake, the distribution system service was restored. Fallen pole was a typical 
damage to the distribution system. 
2.3. Observations, recommendations, and interdependence 
While there were exceptions, good seismic installation practices, such as equipment anchorage and slack 
in conductor connecting equipment were done very well. The underground distribution cable network 
worked well. Other power companies in neighboring countries provided restoration resources, most likely 
through disaster mutual support agreement. Credible seismic installation will reduce loss. 
Power outage resulted in telecommunication, water and wastewater, and train services interruption. 
3. Telecommunication 
All service providers, both landline and wireless services, experienced extensive setbacks due to 
commercial power outages, unanchored equipment failures, building failures, and loss of reserve power in 
most distributed network facilities (BTSs, small remote switches, and digital loop carrier (DLC) remote 
terminals). Only critical offices—Central Offices (COs) over 5000 subscribers, MTSOs (Mobile Telephone 
Switching Offices), and fiber backbone carrier offices—have backup power generators.  Both landline 
system and wireless system were restored within 7 days after the earthquake. 
3.1. Landline system 
Although fiber optic cables were severed in many locations due to co-locating on bridges and overpasses 
and permanent ground deformation, alternative links provided by other companies allowed a limited 
number of transmission circuits for inter LATA (local access and transport area) operation. However, with 
increase in call volume and reduction of circuits many calls could not be completed.  
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Close to 200 outside plant DLC (Digital Loop Carrier) or DSLAM (Digital Subscriber Line Access 
Multiplexer) remote terminals were affected mostly due to lack of power. Close to 150,000 landline 
subscribers were affected as most of them were connected to small remote offices with less than 5,000 
subscribers.  
In one CO a backup generator failed due to transfer switch malfunction, which was used to power the air 
conditioner. This caused overheating of electronic components that resulted in equipment failure. 
Switching equipment damage in a CO in Concepción. Battery damage was also observed.  Landline 
system was restored within three days after the earthquake. 
3.2. Wireless system 
About 70% to 80% of the cell sites in Regions VII and VIII had problems with either equipment or 
antennas damage. This rate falls to about 50% in Region V (north of Region VII). Equipment in BTSs is not 
anchored. COs and MTSOs have seismic designed equipment. Fallen perimeter walls or nearby structures 
collapse affected operation in many BTS sites. Collateral damage to BTS antennas occurred in many 
locations. 
There were logistical problems to refuel BTSs with permanent generators or at sites where portable 
generators were deployed. Diesel supply was difficult to ensure. Road conditions and lack of power at 
diesel supply points affected recovery operations. Theft of batteries, generators, and diesel was an 
additional problem not expected. 
3.3. Observations, recommendations, and interdependence 
Collocated facilities damage happened in most earthquakes, redundancy and dispersed routes should be 
developed to reduce loss of service. Equipment should be adequately anchored. Either extend the battery 
power supply duration or provide backup generator power should be considered in all BTSs. Power 
generators should be installed in difficult to access sites. 
Many service providers (such as water, power, emergency response, airports, etc.) depend on 
telecommunication to restore service or to coordinate restoration efforts. The loss of cellular systems had 
impacted utilities that rely on cellular phones as communication tool to repair crews. Utilities shall use their 
own radio system as their basic communication tool while cellular phones are used as a backup. 
4. Water and Wastewater Systems 
Information of water system performance was provided by Essbío Water Department in Region VIII. 
Most of the damage occurred in Region VIII. 
4.1. Water system 
Essbío provides potable water to about 4 million people of communities in Concepción area. Each 
community has its own system that is not interconnected. The potable water systems include about 7,000 
km of transmission and distribution pipe. There are 1,200 km of pipes in the city of Concepción. The 
heaviest damage of Essbío water systems was concentrated in Concepción and Talcahuano. Pipe breaks 
were caused by strong ground motion in firm ground area and by lateral spread and settlement in the river 
bank areas. In tsunami-impacted areas, damaged sea wall and buildings led to damage buried pipelines. 
Damage to the Concepción area water treatment plant included, i) severe damage to intake structure due 
to a combination of lateral spreads and ground shaking, ii) internals damage to four clarifiers (baffles, 
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settlers and supporting elements), iii) damage to suspended ceilings in control room, and water quality 
laboratory, iv) toppling of computer monitors and computers in control room, v) toppling of water quality 
test equipment and glassware from countertops. In the Concepción area distribution system, there were 72 
breaks and leaks to large diameter welded steel pipes. As of mid-April 2010, about 3,000 repairs had been 
made to smaller diameter pipes. Prior to the earthquake, the net leak rate was about 40%. The leak rate in 
April 2010 was about 60%.  
Over the past 50 years, the government of Chile has constructed nearly 2,000 elevated potable water 
tanks in small rural areas country wide, of which about 420 were in the strong earthquake areas. At least 73 
of the elevated tanks completely collapsed due to inertial overloads. 
The Santiago water system includes two large water treatment plants on the east side of the city. Potable 
water outages in the Santiago area were sporadic and many areas had no outages. 
4.2. Wastewater system 
Wastewater systems in Concepción sustained heavy damage. The wastewater treatment plants 
experienced structural damage due to inertial overload. The large diameter interceptor pipes, and small 
diameter collector pipes were broken due to permanent ground deformation. Prior to the repairs were 
completed, the untreated wastewater was discharged to the river. 
4.3. Irrigation system 
Water canals and hydraulic structures are used in many areas to deliver water from the Andes to 
communities in the central agricultural areas for irrigation purposes. As of April 1, 2010, the status was 
US$ 2M emergency repairs and US$57M projected long-term repairs. As many as 42 facilities were 
initially categorized as in extreme emergency condition, 32 facilities in serious condition, 25 collapsed, 38 
with various levels of structural damage, 1 overflowed, and 2 ruptured.  
4.4. Observations, recommendations, and interdependence 
One fire was reported in the Concepción after the earthquake. The fire happened in the Chemical 
Laboratory of Concepción University, which was burned down. Many research works were destroyed. The 
lost of water supply might be the cause of the total destruction. There were two other fires reported that had 
been set by people. Loss of electric power and telecommunication resulted in longer duration to restore 
service as the utility people use cellular phones to dispatch service crews.  The utility should have their 
own communication system such as radio instead of relying on the cellular phone system that is not under 
their control. 
5. Transportations 
The transportation system sustained significant damage, however the recovery was quick considering 
the size of this event. Except for the north-south rail transportation system, all other transportation systems 
were temporarily repaired within a week.  
5.1. Roads and bridges 
Both roads and bridges damage were significant. More than 300 bridges in the earthquake-impacted area 
sustained various degree of damage. Along Hwy #5 there were 5 collapsed bridges between Santiago and 
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Chillan. Even in Santiago there were a few overpasses collapsed. In Concepción the three main bridges that 
cross Biobío River were damage, one was open using a bailey bridge for the collapsed section.  The other 
two were closed to traffic causing congestion during rush hours.  
About 110 locations of roads sections were damaged, not including the roads in tsunami impacted area. 
Soil slumping on the edge of the shoulder, and surface cracks were the commonly observed damage to 
roads and highways in Region VII and Region VIII.  Detours in many locations were easily put in place to 
provide service. 
5.2. Rail system 
There was minor damage to railway tracks that run along Hwy #5. The electric powered cars were not 
operating due to power distribution system failures. A few sections of the railway track had fallen power 
poles. It was reported that several of the older adobe stations in the effected regions require significant 
repairs. The local commuter trains in Concepción were operating. 
5.3. Airports
5.3.1. Santiago International Airport 
Santiago (Arturo Merino Benítez) International Airport passenger terminal building was close for a 
week due to extensive non-structural elements damage on both floors, the departure and arrival floor. In the 
departure hall (about 300 x 60 meters) about 90% of the ceiling tiles fell. A few pipes in washrooms were 
broken. Many overhead light fixtures were damaged. HVAC equipment and ducts were shaken loose from 
the ceiling and fell. A few glass windows were broken or shaken loose. The only structural damage was two 
catwalks connecting the terminal building to the overpass collapsed.  
The mounting pedestal of the steel frame that connects the cab of the control tower to the concrete 
structure was damaged; the anchors were too close to the edge of the concrete pedestal.  Due to strong 
shaking the equipment in the cab was damaged. Only two glass windows were broken. The traffic control 
has been relocated to the secondary control tower until the main tower is repaired 
The airport was open to a limited number of passenger flights two days after the earthquake. Tents were 
used as temporary immigration and customs inspection points, and airline check in counters.  
5.3.2. Concepción International Airport 
Concepción (Carriel Sur) International Airport is designated as the backup airport for Santiago. 
Unfortunately, communication to Concepción International Airport was disrupted and flights could not be 
directed to Concepción International Airport even if it did not have any problem. The Concepción 
International Airport terminal building had water damage due to broken sprinkler system. That resulted in 
water damage to equipment and escalators within the terminal building. A few glass panels and doors were 
broken. 
The control tower of this airport had a few panes of glass windows broken and some equipment on the 
desks fell over the counter top. There was no commercial flight for 10 days after the earthquake. The airport 
typically averaged 50 operations (take-off and landing) per day prior to the earthquake. During relief efforts, 
operations peaked at more than 340 operations per day, placing significant stress on the small crew of 6 
qualified air traffic controllers and one supervisor for two weeks. 
There was no damage to the runways, but as a precaution the Instrument Landing System (ILS) was put 
out of service until it was recalibrated by a check flight from Santiago. 
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5.3.3. Los Angeles Airport 
This is a small commuter flight airport that serves the Los Angeles area. It was close to all flights except 
relief supply flights. There was extensive damage to the control tower.  The terminal building a wood 
construction and the damage was limited to glass on door and windows.  
5.4. Sea ports  
5.4.1. Talcahuano Area 
Isla Rocuant, an industrial area of fish processing plants, was almost demolished by the tsunami. The 
industrial portion of the port was devastated with wave of 4-5 meters high. A fish oil tank was relocated by 
the tsunami more than 300 meters from its original location. Depending on orientation relative to the 
tsunami, some nearby ports suffered only minor damage. 
5.4.2. Coronel Port 
Pier 1 at the Coronel Port sustained significant damage to piles that are close to the shoreline; a few piles 
had welds completely broken from the bottom of the pier deck. Supporting beams close to the abutment 
were deformed. Damage observed mainly was due to lateral spreading.   
Pier 2 at Coronel was constructed with seismic isolation design and it had only very minor surface cracks 
around a few pier heads. The conveyor pier for transporting minerals from ships to warehouses was under 
construction and only suffered minor damage.   
South of Coronel Port, a pier (Lo Rojas) mainly used by the fisheries industry was damaged by lateral 
spreading and was partially collapsed. The power supply cable for the crane at the end of the pier was 
severed. It was reported that this pier would be replaced.  
5.4.3. Lirquen Port 
The Lirquen Port sustained very minor damage to the piers. Two warehouses in this port sustained 
extensive structural damage. In April 2010, one of the warehouses had been demolished, while the largest 
one was being repaired. Cargo transportation was affected because two railway tracks that routed through 
the undamaged warehouses were severed in several locations. The severed rail tracks were embedded in 
concrete and had been snapped longitudinally due to ground deformation. Railway tracks on ties were not 
damaged. 
5.5. Observations, recommendations, and interdependence 
Failure of many bridges may be due to insufficient detailing of joints to develop a load path to the super 
structure and eventually to the foundation. New bridges with skewed supports failed while old bridges, 
adjacent to the failed bridge, with no skew remained standing.  Many bridges should have been designed to 
provide full serviceability following a major earthquake as experienced in Chile.  Poor soil and the lack of 
subgrade soil treatment during road construction, or badly compacted fills were the main causes of many 
road failures.   
Non-structural elements in airport terminals should be installed with good seismic designs to prevent 
damage that cause disruption.  
At Coronel Port good seismic design demonstrated reduce business interruption. 
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Transportation systems are coupled to economic well being of a country, mitigation efforts should 
continue in these systems to reduce losses. 
6. Gas and Liquid Fuel 
Santiago is supplied with imported LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). There is a limited amount of natural 
gas imported from Argentina via pipelines to supply the old inner city of Concepción. LPG (Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas) is the principal gas fuel for the remainder of Chile. Marine offloading facilities at 
Concepción had minor damage, which had been repaired. The LPG terminal and bulk storage facilities 
were repaired. There was no damage observed in the gas storage facilities in Concepción. 
6.1. Refinery
Chile has two principal oil refineries, one west of Santiago and one in Concepción, and a very small one 
(Magallanes) in the very southern part of Chile. Both large refineries shut down (loss of power, check 
critical elements, appraise possible damage) with only minor, non-critical damage. The Aconcagua refinery 
near Santiago had minor damage not related to the operation of the facility and restarted 10 days after the 
earthquake when safety check was completed. The capacity of this refinery is about 98,000 bpd (barrels per 
day).  The refractory in the heaters room fell to the heater floors in Biobío refinery near Concepción 
precluding the use of the heaters. There was minor damage to pipes, and other structures in the plant. 
Therefore Biobío refinery was shut down after the earthquake.   
Due to liquefaction and lateral spreading along the beach, one of the two steel crude oil pipelines that 
feed into the refinery failed. It has been estimated that three to seven months will be required to bring the 
refinery to its operating capacity of 130,000 bpd. 
6.2. Tanks farms 
Tank sloshing occurred in floating roof tanks with resulting spillover of product. One floating roof tank 
developed a leak due to local ground failures.  
An unanchored 1.4 million-liter welded steel water tank collapsed at the Santiago International Airport 
due to sloshing. The water is for fire fighting for the airport, and was full at the time of the earthquake. Tank 
failure was likely due to repeated uplifts, and wall buckling.   
6.3. Observations, recommendations, and interdependence 
The damage to the gas and liquid fuel system was light. The refinery closures were precautionary 
measures to ensure production plant safety. It is a good practice to carefully inspect all elements within a 
refinery prior to starting production after a strong earthquake. Both electric power and telecommunication 
played an important role in the recovery of the plant.   
Shortage of fuel slowed down the recovery of the telecommunication system that required backup 
generator to power the equipment during power outage. 
7. Lifelines Interdependence 
In addition to physical damage to lifelines functional interdependence between electric power, 
transportation, telecommunication, and water systems has significant impact on the recovery and 
restoration processes of these individual systems. The loss of functionality due to co-location has been 
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recorded in many earthquakes since the ASCE post earthquake investigations started in the early 1970’s. 
Physical and functional coupling between lifelines becomes an important element in developing resilience 
in post earthquake performance from a functional point of view.  
Immediately after the earthquake the effect of interdependence becomes prominent among 
roads/highways, electric power, and telecommunication. Damaged roads and highways hindered recovery 
of the electric power distribution system to speed up telecommunication damage restoration.  Economic 
impact to businesses due to power outage and lose of telecommunication was an important coupling that 
was observed in Chile. This will take at least a few months when the power and telecommunication system 
completely return to normal condition. 
In this earthquake, co-located equipment such as antenna, power cables, and pipelines in damaged 
buildings, collapsed buildings and bridges demonstrated system vulnerability to service interruption. 
8. Conclusions 
Significant mitigation efforts against earthquake losses have been going on in Chile since the two large 
earthquakes that occurred in 1960 and 1985. The low number of casualties and the relatively short duration 
of lifeline services interruption that occurred in this large earthquake is an obvious result of these mitigation 
efforts. With respect to lifelines, many more lessons will be learned from this latest earthquake, particularly 
in the area of interdependence. The study of lifeline resiliency must continue with a focus on cost effective 
expenditures for earthquake preparedness to lifeline service providers. 
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